suggest that there might be a relationship between the budget balance and the budget composition. They also suggest that cuts in the "welfare state' will have to be a critical part of the necessary fiscal adjustments upcoming.
The standard macroeconomic literature on fiscal policy generally ignores issues of composition of the budget. It is fairly common practice to think of government spending as 'purchase of goods and services', a component which is becoming less and less important empirically.^ From a policy perspective, instead, changes in the composition of the budget are extremely important. When policymakers must improve the budget balance, they can raise taxes and/ or cut expenditures. But which of the two sides should be used? Which component of expenditure can and should be cut? Which taxes should be raised?
The first question which we address is the relationship between the ' A partial exception K thr 'overlapping generations' literature, which focuses on interfi^ncralional transfers, although not explicity on the composition of the budget. Some of thr new politicai economy literature focuses on the redistributixr role of fiscal policy and therefore, indirectly, on budget composition. For a survey of this literature, lee AJesina and Perotti {1995a). fiscal stance, i.e. loose or tight budget balance, and the composition of expenditures and revenues. We discuss whether fiscal expansions and fiscal adjustments rely on specific items of the budget more than on other items.
The second, related, question is whether the composition of fiscal adjustments influences the likelihood of success, defined as a relatively permanent consolidation of the budget. Do successful adjustments rely primarily on expenditure cuts or tax increases? Are cuts in transfer programmes and social expenditures a necessary component of successful adjustments?
Third, we ask several politico-economic questions. Which types of government are more likely to follow loose or tight fiscal policies? Are coalition governments or single-party governments more likely to accomplish successful adjustments? Are there significant differences between left-wing and right-wing governments? Are loose policies typically followed in an election year?
Loose policies are the result of sharp increases in government expenditure, particularly transfer programmes; conversely, tight policies are carried out through increases in taxes
The answers
First of all, we find important asymmetries between loose and tight fiscal policies. On average, loose policies are the result of sharp increases in government expenditure, particularly transfer programmes; conversely, tight policies are carried out through increases in taxes, particularly direct taxes on households, rather than through reductions in expenditure.
However, and this is our second major conclusion, the previous result, concerning average adjustments, overlooks a fiindamental difference between successful and unsuccessful adjustments. Successful adjustments (a minority of the total) rely mostly on cuts in tnmsfer programmes and in government wages and employment. Unsuccessful adjustments rely primarily on increases in taxes, leaving transfer programmes and government wages and employment untouched, or even increased.
Third, in contrast with single-party governments, coalition governments are incapable of achieving a stable consolidation of the budget. They often try but systematically fail. On the other hand, we do not find much difference between left-wing and right-wiiŝ ingle-party governments in their ability to implement successfiil adjustments.
Relationship with the literature
Our paper is related to four lines of work. The first is the literature on fiscal adjustments, which includes, for instance, Alesina (1988) , Dombusch (1989) , and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . Relative to these papers we emphasize the detailed composition of public budgets, using not a case study method but, instead, statistical evidence. A recent paper by de Haan et al. (1992) discusses not only fiscal adjustments, but more generally, the evolution of fiscal policy (both on the expenditure side euid on the taxation side) in Europe. While we share with that paper an emphasis on compositional issues, we have a less broadly descriptive and more specific purpose in mind.
The second related line of research studies whether budget deficits are primarily the result of increases in aggregate expenditure or cuts in aggregate taxation. For instance, Bohn (1991) addresses this issue with specific reference to the United States. While we touch upon this issue as well, our goal in this paper is much broader: first, we emphasize the composition of expenditure and taxation, not only their aggregate levels; second, we analyse several other important issues; third, our analysis covers almost all OECD countries.
A third line of relevant work concerns the political economy of budget deficits, recently surveyed in Alesina and Perotti (1995a) . In particular, we touch upon issues related to empirical results by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and Grilli et a/. (1991) on the eflFects of coalition governments on the budget balance. These authors study the effects of different types of government on debt; we emphasize more the propensity to initiate fiscal adjustments and their likelihood of success. We also relate, in part, to the literature on political business cycles and, specificaUy, on the effects of the electoral cycle on fiscal policy, an issue recently addressed empirically for OECD countries by Alesina et al. (1993) .
Finally, in defining our measure of discretionary fiscal policy we refer to the literature on how to 'adjust' standard me£isures of budget balance for the cycle. We found Blanchard (1993) particularly illuminating on this point. McKenzie (1989) provides a very useful broad discussion of the literature.
Summary
This paper is organized £is follows. Section 2 discusses aJtemative measures of discretionary fiscal policy. We describe the measure which we use throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses the behaviour of aggregate expenditure and taxation in periods of loose and tight fiscsJ policy. Section 4 continues this analysis by disaggregating expenditures and taxes in several components. Section 5 provides a definition of successful versus unsuccessful fiscal adjustments and identifies several features which differentiate them. In section 6 we study the robustness of our results, along several dimensions. Section 7 addresses politico-economic questions, asking, in particular, which types of government are more likely to implement successful adjustments. Section 8 discusses various related points concerning possible alternative explanations of our findings and related issues. The last section concludes.
THE FISCAL IMPULSE

The discretionary component of fiscal poiicy
In this paper, we are mainly interested in those changes in fiscal policy that result from intentional actions by the policy-makers; we are less interested in those changes that derive from the effect of the economic cycle on expenditure and tax revenues. We define thit fiscal impulse as the disaetionary change in the budgetary position of the government. Roughly speaking, the fiscal impulse is designed to A usefiil measure of the fiscal stance must be simple eliminate the effects of business cycles on the budget. It is the difference between the actual budgetary position and what would prevail under a benchmark cyclical situation. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted method of defining what part of the current budgetary position reflects an exogenous action on the part of the government and what part is merely a reflection of the cycle. Schematically, there are two types of problem: (1) How is the benchmark situation that is used to adjust the actual measure to be defined? (2) What parts of the budget should be adjusted to this benchmark, and how? For instance, should interest payments be adjusted for inflation, and if so, how?
Addressing the first problem involves taking a stance on controversial conceptual and statistical issues. For instance, how should we estimate potential output, to be used, in conjunction with Okun's law, to adjust the value of several expenditures sensitive to the cycle, like unemployment benefits? Addressing the second problem presents difficulties that are more practical in nature. For instance, to adjust unemployment benefits one would ideally need rather detailed information on replacement ratios. More generally, one would need a set of elasticities of the various types of taxes and expenditures to income, unemployment and inflation. In addition to these widely acknowledged issues, some authors, in particular Buiter (1983 Buiter ( , 1985 , have argued that a proper measure of the deficit and of the fiscal stance should take into account all changes in the public sector net worth. Thus, according to Buiter, a "standard' cyclical adjustment of the deficit measure would not be enough (McKenzie, 1989 , provides more discussion on this point).
A useful measure of the fiscal stance must be simple, even at the cost of ignoring relatively important considerations. Fortunately, for our purposes, simplicity does not come at a high price. First, we are only interested in changes in the budgetary position of the government. Therefore, for any year the benchmark can be safely assumed to be the previous year. This avoids the problem of choosing a base year when actual output was supposedly at its potential level. Second, we largely take care of the inflation-adjustment problem by excluding interest payments from our measures of the budgetary position of the government. Third, we focus on 'large' changes in the budgetary position, such that are unlikely to be caused by purely cyclical factors. Table 3 describes four widely used measures of the fiscal impulse. It is worth mentioning at the outset that the qualitati\e conclusions of our analysis are not sensitive to the choice of the meiisure, as we show in section 6. The simplest possible definition of the fiscal impulse is the change in the primary deficit as a share of GDP from the previous year (the primary deficit excludes interest expenditures). Implicitly this measure takes the previous year as the benchmark year. The great advantage of this measure is its simplicity. Its disadvantage is that it ignores cyclicaDy induced fiuctuations in the primary deficit.B lanchard (1993) suggests a very attractive way of addressing this problem without sacrificing simplicity. His measure still takes the previous year as the benchmark year, but recognizes that government outlays can be negatively related to GDP, because of built-in stabilizers like unemployment compensation. Similarly, revenues can be positively related to GDP: for instance, because of the progressivity of the tax system. For both reasons, the deficit tends to rise endogenously during recessions. To correct for this, without at the same time resorting to estimates of potential output of dubious reliability, Blanchard suggests estimating what government outlays and revenues would be in any given year if the unemployment rate had remained the same as in the previous year.T he third measure, frequently used by the OECD (Ghouraqui et ai, 1990) and also known as the 'Dutch measure', defines the fiscal impulse as the difference between the current primary deficit and the primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditure in the previous year had grown with potential GDP, and revenues had grown with actual GDP. Thus, like the first two measures, the Dutch Note, however, that if the endogenous component of all revenues and expenditures were unit elastic to actual GDP, this measure would identify all and only discretionary changes in fiscal policy. Thus, this measure is not a bad approximation as long as expenditures and revenues are close to being unit elastic to GDP.
This measure is implemented as follows. For each country in the sample, we regress social transfers as a share of GDP (TRANSF) on two time trends for 1960-75 and 1976-92 and on the unemployment rate (U):
We then estimate what transfers would be in period / if unemployment were the same as in the previous year.
where the di's are the estimated coefficients in regression 1 and f( is the estimated residual in the same regression. We follow the same procedure for total revenues T,, to obtain r, ([/,_i) . Having constructed TRANSFt(Ut-i) and Tt([/,_,), we can compute the primary deficit that would have prevailed in period / had the unemployment rate been equal to period /-I's unemployment rate. The measure of the fiscal impulse is then constructed as the difference between this unemployment-adjusted measure of the primary deficit and the previous year's primary deficit.
measure takes the previous year as the benchmark year. However, now the cyclically neutral expenditure is assumed to be proportiona] to potential output, while the cyclically neutral taxation is assumed to be proportional to actual output.* In comparison, the advantage of the Blanchard measure is that it does not rely on estimates of potentijil output. The OECD measure is also sensitive to the rate of inflation in a rather subde way. Suppose that all prices increase between period t-1 and / by 10%, while all real variables remain constant. Therefore, actual and potential GDP and all nominal expenditures and tax revenues increase by 10%, while all ratios remain constant. Clearly, the discretionary position of the government has not changed. Yet, if the budget is initially in deficit, the fiscal impulse measure will increase, because all nominal e^qiendi-tures and revenues in both periods / and t-l ait divided by GDP in period t-\. The fourth measure, often advocated by the IMF, differs fi-om all the others in that it assumes as the benchmark year not the previous year, but a reference year where potential output was close to actual output. Aside from this difference in the treatment of the benchm<irk year, this measure (also known as the 'German measure') is similar to the OECD measure illustrated above. A disadvantage of the IMF 
M>Us: G,: total current expenditure plus gross capital accumulation less interest payments; 7",: total revenues; g, and /, represent the same variables, but as shares of GDP; T,: nominal GDP; 7,: rate of growth of nominal GDP; },: rate of growth of nominal potential GDP; Go: value of G in base year, when actual output is equal to potential output; To', revenues in base year; U,: unemployment rate.
* Formally, siart irom the following exprrssion for the cyclically adjusted budget balance {CAB):
where gt-\ i> the ratio of government expenditure to potential GDP in period t-I, d-i is the ratio of taxation to actual GDP in period <-1, and Y, and Vt are potential and actual GDP in period (, reapectively. The measure is obtained by taking the tint diSerenoe of (he CAB, and dividing by GDP in period (-1. We are not quite sure about the motivation for the asymmetric treatment of spending and income.
measure is the degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the base year. Because of its greater simplicity, in the remainder of this paper we focus our presentation on results obtained using the Blanchard meiisure. In section 6, we show that our results do not change when the other three measures are used. The reason is that, since we focus on relatively large changes in the budgetary position, the details of the cyclical adjustment do not affect the nature of our results. We view this result as quite reassuring.
Loose and tight fiscal policies
We focus on significant changes in the fiscal position of the government. Thus, not only are we not interested in cyclical fluctuations of the budget balance, but also we want to disregard very small discretionary changes in fiscal policy. Instead, we want to focus on relatively large discretionary fiscal impulses, positive and negative. Our sample includes yearly observations on expenditures and revenues (defined precisely in the Appendix) from 1960 to 1992 for twenty OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. We consider the general government, rather than the central government. This has one advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is that the definition of general government is more comparable across countries. In fact, according to the OECD, the general government includes 'all departments, offices, organisations and other bodies which are agencies or instruments of the central, state or local public authorities', including 'all social security arrangements for large sections of the population imposed, controlled or financed by a government', and "government enterprises which mainly produce goods and services for government itself or primarily sell goods and services to the public on a small scale'. Using general government data therefore avoids the problem of allocating expenditures to, say, state rather than local governments, or to the central administration rather than to social security funds, which sometimes can be difficult and unreliable in a crosscountry comparison. The disadvantage of working with general government data is that the fiscal manoeuvres we focus on are typically carried out through the central government budget. As a consequence, fluctuations in the general government balance may reflect effects coming from local governments which are unrelated to the kind of issues we are investigating here. While in the future we We focus on large discretionary fiscal impulses, positive and negative intend to explore the behaviour of the different levels of governments along the lines we follow here for the general government, at present the much larger availability of data for the general government makes us prefer the approach we take in this paper.
We have a total of 547 observations on our measure of the fiscal impulse, which we label BFI, for 'Blanchard Fiscal Impulse'. The sample average of BFI is -0.008% of GDP, with a standard deviation of 1.67% of GDP. We classify the_^ca/ stance according to the value of the fiscal impulse, as follows:
Definition 1. The fiscai stance
In any given year, the fiscal stance is: Neutral Loose or a small expansion Very loose or a strong expansion Tight or a small adjustment whenBnis(% of GDP): between -0.5 and 0.5 between 0.5 and 1.5 larger than 1.5 between -1.5 and -0.5 Very tight or a strong adjustment less than 1.5
The numbers of loose and tight cases, and of very loose and very tight cases are similar
In defining the cut-off points of Definition 1, we are trading off two opposite requirements. On one hand, we need to make sure that very loose or very tight policies are really different from 'business as usual', and that they are not unduly influenced by cyclical factors, despite our correction for unemployment. This consideration would require setting high cut-off points for these policies. On the other hand, in order to have enough power for our tests, we need to have a suflicient number of observations for each type of fjolicy. In general we find that our results change in an intuitive way when we experiment with different cut-off points: for instance, if we define very loose or very tight fiscal policies more restrictively, the differences between these policies and 'normal' times become larger.* Table 4 provides some summary information on the four types of fiscal policy stance generated by the cut-off points of Definition 1. Note from the first column that we have a very similar number of Results on this point are available upon request. loose and tight cases (124 and 121, respectively) and of very loose zxxd very tight cases (65 and 66, respectively). Note also that the cutoff points for strong expansions and strong adjustments correspond closely to the average of the BFI plus or minus one standard deviation, respectively. Table 5 lists all the cases of strong expansion and strong adjustment obtained with Definition 1. The table suggests several interesting observations. First, our definition captures quite well some well-known episodes of strong and prolonged fiscal adjustments in the mid-1980s, like Denmark and Ireland. Second, the large number of strong expansions in the period 1974-6 are clearly a response to the first oil shock. Every country except four (Greece, Ireland, Spain and UK) has had at least one strong expansion in this three-year period. Third, many countries display a typical 'stop and go' behaviour, with strong adjustments followed by strong expansions, and vice versa: for instance, Finland in the 1970s and Portugal in the 1980s. Finally, as we focus on strong expansions and adjustments, we do not capture periods of progressive deterioration of the budget without major jumps in the discretionary component of fiscal policy. For instance, from 1974 onward Italy shows only two years of major expansion, despite a change in the debt/GDP ratio from about 50% in 1974 to the current 125%.
One might argue that the criterion of Definition 1 fails to capture an important difference between countries: an increase in the primary deficit by 1.5% of GDP may represent a large expansion for Germany, but little more than 'business as usual' in, say, Italy. To address this issue, we have computed the mean and standard deviation of the BFI separately for each country, and we have modified Definition 1 as follows: 1975 , 76, 91, 92 1967 , 75 1975 , 81 1975 , 82, 91 1975 , 87, 88 1%3, 74, 75, 78, 87,%, 91, 92 1975 ,81,92 1974 , 75, 90 1981 , 85, 88, 89 1978 1965 , 71, 72, 75,81 1975 1975 , 87 1970 , 76, 77, 86, 91 1963 , 74, 75,81,83,87 1982 1974 , 77, 79, 88. 91 1971 ,72,90,91,92 l%7, 75 Strong adjustments 1974 , 77, 87 1977 , 84 1982 , 84 1981 1983 , 84, 85, 86 1964 , 67, 73, 76, 84, 1%9 1969 , 73, 76, 89 1982 , 86, 87, 90, 91, 1984 , 87, 88, 89 1967 , 74, 76, 80, 89, 1984 1985 , 91 1979 . 80. 83. 84. 89, 1%7, 77. 80. 82. 84, 1986 .87 1971 .76,83.84.87 1969 , 77, 88 1969 All our results remain practically unchanged if Definition Ibis rather than Definition 1 is adopted.^ In the remainder of the paper, we present results based on Definition 1.
AGGREGATE EXPENDITURES AND TAXATION AND THE FISCAL STANCE
In this section we ask the question of whether expansions are typically the results of increases in expenditure or cuts in taxation and, similarly, whether adjustments typically occur on the expenditure side or on the tax side. Table 6 reports sample statistics for our measure of the fiscal impulse, and for its two main components, total expenditure (net of interest payments) and total taxation, under the different types of fiscal stance. Total expenditure and taxation are not unemploymentadjusted; evaluating them at the previous year's unemployment rate, however, would not make any difference in our result. An interesting feature that emerges from this table is that, on average, episodes of strong adjustment are the mirror image of episodes of strong expansion: in fact, the average increase in the adjusted deficit during the former (2.81% of GDP) is very close, in absolute value, to the average fall during the latter (2.61% of GDP). This means that any significant asymmetry in the behaviour of each particular type of On average, episodes of strong adjustment are the mirror image of episodes of strong expansion expenditure or taxation that may emerge between the two fiscal policy stances is due to a genuine qualitative difference in the working of fiscal policy during strong expansions and strong adjustments, and not to different sizes of the change. Similarly, the average fall in the adjusted deficit during small adjustments (0.93% of GDP) is identical to the average increase during small expansions, even though this similarity is less surprising, given the nature of our definitions. Aggregate expenditure (column (3)) and aggregate taxation (column (4)) also present an important asymmetry. Expansions result mainly from increases in expenditure, adjustments from increases in taxation. This is particularly evident when comparing loose and tight fiscal policies, but also very loose and very tight fiscal policies, although in this last case some adjustment occurs on the expenditure side as well.
In summary. Table 6 suggests that in loose years there are virtually no changes in taxes, and in tight years there are virtually no changes in spending. In very loose years, spending increases on average by 2.25% of GDP, while taxes are cut by only by 0.17% of GDP. In very tight years taxes are increased by 1.2% of GDP and spending is cut by 0.79% of GDP. These results suggest that increases in expenditure during loose fiscal stances tend to be permanent and set the stage for subsequent tax increases. Note that in this table, as in those that follow, the algebraic sum of the average change in expenditures and taxation does not equal the BFI measure. This is because the definition of the primary deficit used in constructing the BFI measure includes some minor items, like consumption of fixed capital and net capital transfers, that do not appear in the variables used in the tables.
A similar picture emerges from the regression analysis of Table 7 , where we ask how total expenditure and total taxation (as shares of GDP) change according to the general fiscal stance. To answer this question, we partition all the observations into the five categories corresponding to Definition 1, and we regress the change in expenditures and incomes on the corresponding five dummy variables as well as three macroeconomic variables expected to affect fiscal policy outcomes over and beyond the particular regime prevalent at the time. The three macroeconomic variables are: the change in the rate of inflation, the change in the unemployment rate, and the change in the rate of growth of GDP. The five dummy variables define the fiscal policy impulse in that year: for instance, Tight tsikes the value 1 in periods of tight fiscal policy according to Definition 1, and similarly for the other djimmy variables. The coefficient of each dummy variable measures the effect of the fiscal stance on public spending or revenues -as a proportion of GDP. Column (1) looks at expenditures. We expect a negative coefficient on the inflation variable: when inflation increases, government expenditure as a share of GDP decreases because in the short run several expenditures are fixed in nominal terms or not perfectly indexed to the price level. We also expect a positive coefficient on the unemployment variable because of the effects of built-in stabilizers like unemployment insurance, and a negative coefficient on the growth variable because many expenditures are fixed in advance at some level consistent with an 'average' or "long-run' level of income. Column (2) presents the results for revenues. The sign of the coefficient of inflation is a priori ambiguous. On one hand, a rise in inflation tends to increase income tax revenues relative to GDP because, at the rates of inflation prevailing in OECD countries, the bracket creeping efTect arising from imperfect indexation of income tax brackets clearly prevails over the Olivera-Tanzi effect. On the other hand, a rise in inflation tends to decrease the share of social security contributions in GDP, since social security contributions are usually paid only on those parts of the wage below a certain maximum value, which is usually not indexed to the price level. Because social security contributions are a sizeable share of total revenues, and the largest single source in several countries including France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, this second effect can be quite substantial. We expect a negative coefficient on unemployment and a positive coefficient on growth essentially because of the automatic stabilizing features of many taxes. The coefficients of the economic determinants of expenditure in column (1) of Table 8 have all the expected signs and are highly significant. In column (2), the coefficients of unemployment and growth have the wrong sign. This suggests the following explanation: when unemployment increases or growth decreases, governments react by increasing expenditure (relative to GDP); taxation also rises in order to keep up, at least partially, with the increase in expenditure. For instance, during the recession of the mid-1970s, budget deficits rose everywhere, but in most countries taxation increased relative to GDP.
Our focus is, however, on the remaining five dummy variables. The pattern of the coefficients clearly confirms the results of Table 7 . Expansions are very much the mirror image of adjustments: during expansions, most of the action is on expenditure, while during adjustments, it is on taxation. In fact, the coefficient of Ljoose in column (1) is almost identical to the coefficient of HffU in column (2); on average, total expenditure during small expansions and total taxation during small adjustments increase by the same amount, about 0.85% of GDP. On the other hand, the coefficients both of Ti^t in column (1) and oi Loose in column (2) are practically zero. A similar pattern emerges from a comparison of very loose and very tight episodes. In this case some adjustment in very tight years also occurs on the spending side, but the adjustment on the taxation side is considerably larger (-0.73 against 1.26). In very loose years, cuts in taxes are about one-quarter of increases in expenditures ( -0.47 against 1.67).
There is a risk that the macroeconomic variables used in these regressions, particularly inflation, are affected by fiscal policy rather than the other way round, as implicitly assumed. We have two answers to this legitimate concern. First, even if this is the case and, therefore, the estimates of coefficients of all macroeconomic variables are biased, there is no reason why this bias should affect, say, the coefficient of the Tight dummy variable differently for expenditure and taxation. In other words, it is difficult to imagine why reverse causality should induce the asymmetry in the estimated coefficients of the fiscal stance dummy variables in columns (1) and (2). Second, the coefficients of the fiscal stance dummy variables in Table 8 imply average changes that are very close to the sample averages displayed in Table 7 . This suggests that the effects of unemployment, inflation and growth are not of primary importance for the issues we are concerned with here.
The main findings of this section can be summarized as follows: (1) the average increase in the unemployment-adjusted primary deficit during expansions {BFI) is very close to the average fall during adjustments; (2) expansions are mostly the result of increases in expenditure, while adjustments are mostly the result of increases in taxation.
DISAGGREGATING EXPENDITURE AND TAXATION
In this section, we disaggregate total expenditure and taxation, and analyse how their individual components behave in the different types of fiscal stance. For each policy stance. expenditure (which are a small part of the adjustment) fall primarily on public investment. The average increase in transfers during loose and, particularly, very loose years is quite remarkable. In the latter case, transfers increase by more than 1.15% of GDP! Government wages also increase substantially during very loose years, by more than one half of a point of GDP. By contrast, government transfers and wages fall only slightly during very tight years, by about 0.09% and 0.16% of GDP, respectively. The share of non-wage government consumption (together with subsidies) shows the least interesting and significant movements. Paradoxically, government consumption typically receives the most attention in the academic debate on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. The data of Table 8 obviously help explain the long-run change in budget composition documented in Table 2 above. Since loose fiscal policies are mainly implemented by increasing transfers, rather than consumption of goods and services, and very tight policies simply raise taxes, in the long run the composition of the budget is bound to tilt in favour of transfer programmes.
Interesting compositional effects also emerge on the taxation side, although the pattern is slightly less clear-cut. Table 9 presents a breakdown of revenues. In loose and very loose years, direct taxes on businesses and indirect taxes are slighdy cut. By contrast, taxes on households are either slightly increased (in loose years) or unchanged (in very loose years). Remember, however, that total tax cuts in loose years are very small. During adjustments, all taxes increase, with the largest increases being on taxes on households and indirect taxes. Taxes on business increase substantially only in very tight years, but are virtually untouched in tight ye£U"s. Social security contributions have a 'life of their ovm' somewhat unrelated to the overall stance of fiscal policy. In particular, social security contributions increase significandy during expansions. This suggests that the contemporaneous increase in social expenditure makes increases in social security contributions more politicaUy acceptable.
The main messages of Tables 8 and 9 can be summarized as follows: (1) On the exj>enditure side, there is an important asynnmetry between adjustments zmd expansions: the former are implemented with very small total cuts in expenditures, concentrated mostly on public investment, with virtually no cuts in transfer programmes. The latter are implemented via ljirge increases in transfers and wage government consumption. (2) Non-wage government consumption is never a primary factor during episodes of change in the fiscal policy Stance. In particular, very loose fiscal policies are engineered through much bigger changes in transfers and wage government consumption than non-wage government consumption.
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL ADJUSTMENTS
Governments incur the economic and political costs of implementing strong adjustments in order to correct for excessive existing deficits and debts. It is then important to investigate how successful strong adjustments have been in correcting these fiscal problems on a permanent basis. This is why we isolate episodes of very tight fiscal policy which have led to a 'long-run' consolidation of the budget, as opposed to episodes which have soon been reversed. We face two data constraints in picking the criterion. First, in order to define a success, we cannot look very far into the future after the year in which the strong adjustment occurred, since most adjustments take place in the mid to late 1980s. Second, if we impose very high 1987 1984 1969 1987, 88, 89 1979, 80 1984, 87 1969, 77, 88 1976 Standards in defuiing a success, we are left with very few observations. We have tried with several different definitions. In the text we present results obtained using Definition 2 below. As we show in section 6, our results are quite robust to changes in the definition.
Definition 2. Successfui adjustments
A successful adjustment in year t is defined as a 'very tight' fiscal stance in year t such that the gross debt/GDP ratio in year t+ 3is at least 5 percentage points of GDP lower than in year /.
In our sample we have 14 successful adjustments and 38 unsuccessful ones. The sum of successful and unsuccessful adjustments, 52, is less than the total of very tight fiscal policies, 66, because 14 episodes of very tight fiscal stance occurred between 1990 and 1992, and therefore cannot be classified as successful or unsuccessflil according to our criterion. Table 10 lists all the cases of successful adjustments.
A few observations are in order. First, the Irish multiyear adjustment clearly stands out, with three consecutive yestrs that satisfy our rather demanding definition. Second, the other wellknown case of fiscal reform of the mid-1980s, Denmark, is also represented, with one successful adjustment in 1984. Third, two years of budget adjustment in Sweden in the mid-1980s are also captured by our definition of success. In light of the more recent developments in the Swedish public finances, this observation highlights how short-run success (captured by our definition) does not necessarily coincide with success defined over a longer horizon. Table 11 shows that the average fall in the fiscal impulse {BFI) as a percentage of GDP is 2.18 for unsuccessful adjustments, and 2.74 for successful ones. Thus, successful adjustments are slighdy larger, but not very much. In other words, it appears that it is not the size of the adjustment that sets aside successful ones from unsuccessful ones; rather it is its composition. This is further analysed in Table 12 , which looks at the details. First, while in successful adjustments almost all the action comes from expenditure cuts, in unsuccessful ones almost all the action comes from an increase in taxes. In successful cases, about 80% of the adjustment is on the expenditure side: in fact, spending is cut by 2.19% of GDP, while taxes increase by less than 0.5% of GDP. In unsuccessfvd ones, the size of tax increases is about three times the size of expenditure cuts: 1.28 against 0.49% of GDP. Second, in successful adjustments the lion's share of the cuts is on transfers and government wages. Each of these categories is cut more than one half per cent of GDP, for a total of about 1.15%, a rather large amount for this kind of government ouday, typically thought of as politically too sensitive to be touched. By contrast, in unsuccessful adjustments the change in transfers and government wages is minimal, and insignificantly different from 0. Rather, public investment falls by as much as all other expenditures combined. This is one of the most important results of the paper. It sends a rather dear message to the policy-maker: any fiscal adjustment hoping to be successful cannot avoid dealing with cuts in the welfare state and in government wages and employment.
Further evidence specifically on government employment is highlighted in Table 13 . The two columns display the average change in government employment as a share of the labour force (column (1)), and as a share of total employment (column (2)), under the difTerent types of fiscal stance. Public employment tends to increase always, including during very tight fiscal policies. But there is a fundamental difference between episodes of very tight fiscal policy that are successful and those that turn out to be unsuccessftil: during the former, the share of public employment, both in the labour force and in total employment, remains essentially constant. During the latter, it increatses at about the same rate as the whole sample average. Table 14 shows the composition of tax increases in successfiil and unsuccessful adjustments. The smaill part of successfiil adjustments that is due to increases in taxes comes jdmost exclusively from direct taxes on business: direct taxes on households are actually cut during successful adjustments! During unsuccessful adjustments, instead, direct taxes on households and indirect taxes are increased substantially, by almost 1 % of GDP in total.
In summary, the results of this section are quite dejir-cut. We can summarize them as follows: (1) Successful and unsuccessful adjustments imply, on average, the same fall in the unemployment-adjusted deficit. However, the former rely mostly on expenditure cuts; the latter, on tax increases. (2) Among ejqjcnditures, successful adjustments are characterized by large cuts in transfers and in wage government consumption. The limited expenditure cuts that occur during unsuccessful adjustments are concentrated mainly on public investment, while transfer programmes and total government wages are essentially unchanged and government employment continues to grow.
ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we investigate how robust our results are, along several dimensions: first, the definition of the fiscal impulse; second, the use of actual GDP to deflate fiscal variables; third, the stringency of the criterion in Definition 2 to determine a successful adjustment; fourth, the criterion used to define a successful adjustment. To save space, in each case we only report the changes in the various types of expenditure in successful and unsuccessful adjustments. Hence, the tables that follow should be compared to Table 12 .Â s discussed in section 2, there are several possible ways to define the fiscal impulse. Table 15 reports the results when the OECD measure of the fiscal impulse is used. Our results are qualitatively unchanged. The only substantial difference is that now transfers fall by less during successful adjustments, relative to our results using the BFI measure. However, they also increase substantially during unsuccessful adjustments, so that in the end the difference between the two types of fiscal stance, 0.38% of GDP, is close to that of These are our calculations of the adjustment using the OECD criterion. We could not use directly the measures adjusted by OECD because the cyclically adjusted data on the individual categories of spending and revenues were not available. Next, in Table 16 we deflate all nominal variables using the potential GDP rather than the actual GDP.^ The rationale for doing this is that in a recession the ratio of government expenditure to GDP may increase not because of an intentional action on the part of the policy-maker, but because the denominator falls. As one can see, the differences with Table 12 are minimal.
One would expect that, as the stringency of the criterion used to define a successful adjustment falls, the difference between successful and unsuccessful episodes should fall too. In Table 17 , we define a successful adjustment as a very tight fiscal policy such that the debt/ GDP ratio after three years is below the debt/GDP ratio at the time of the strong adjustment, while we previously (Definition 2) required that, after three years, the debt/GDP ratio be at least five percentage points below the initial one. As expected, all government expenditures during successful episodes fall by less than in Table  12 , although the difference with respect to unsuccessful episodes remains substantial and significant. For instance, transfers fall by more than a third of a percentage point of GDP in successful adjustments, while they remain constant in unsuccessful ones. Finally, in Table 12 we defined a successftd adjustment with reference to the subsequent faU in the debt/GDP ratio. But another dimension of the success of a very tight fiscal policy is its impact on the budget d^idt. Thus, in Table 18 we define an adjustment as successful if either the debt/GDP ratio after three years has fallen by at least 5% of GDP, or the average deficit in the next three years is below the initial deficit by at least 1.5% of GDP. Because this criterion is easier to satisfy than that of Definition 2, one would expect the difference between successful and unsuccessftil adjustments to be less clear-cut. Indeed, as before the average fall of all ty{>es of expenditure is now slighdy smaller than in Table 12 , but the difference between successful and unsuccessful adjustments is large and significant. 
Our main results are robust to various perturbations
Thus, our main results are robust to various perturbations in the way we define adjustments and success, and in the way we compute cyclically adjusted fiscal variables.
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL EXPANSIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS
Which types of government are more likely to engage in strongly expansionary fiscal policies, and which types are more likely to carry out successful fiscal adjustments? We classify governments according to their ideological orientation and their degree of fractionalization. First, we compare right-wing, centre and left-wing governments. Second, we distinguish between single-party, coalition and minority governments. Both indices are taken from Woldendorp et al. (1993) , who classify each post-war government in twenty parliamentary democracies along several dimensions. (Our source does not have data for Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the USA. For these countries, we constructed the indices using various yearbooks.)
Our ideological index is derived from the series on 'Ideological complexion of government', which classifies governments into five categories, from the most right-wing to the most left-wing: 'governments with right-wing dominance', i.e. with a 'share of seats of right and centre parties in government and their supporting parties in Parliament larger than 66.6%'; 'governments with rightcentre complexion', i.e. with a 'share of seats of right and centre parties in government and their supporting parties in Parliament between 33.3 and 66.6%'; "balanced situation', i.e. governments with a share of centre larger than 50% in government and in Parliament; or, if left and right form a government together not dominated by one side or the other'; the definitions of'government with left-centre complexion' and government with left-wing dominjmce' are symmetric to the first two types, respectively. In constructing our index, we combine the five categories above into three: our category right-wing governments' includes 'governments with right-wing dominance' and 'governments with right-centre complexion'. Similarly, our 'left-wing governments' include 'governments with left-wing dominance' and 'governments with left-centre complexion'. Our category 'centre government' coincides with the original category 'balanced situation' in Woldendorp et al. (1993) . By and large these classifications are fairly unambiguous. Socialist and social democratic parties are classified as 'lefl', Christian democratic and similar parties are classified as 'centre', conservative parties are classified as 'right'. We have not created our own classification, and given the results that follow we very much doubt that perturbations in the definitions due to the few uncertain cases would significantly change the results.
Our index of fractionalization is derived from the 'Types of government' series, which distinguishes six types of government: 'sii^le-party', 'minimal winning coalition', "surplus coalition', 'singleparty minority', 'multi-party minority', 'caretaker' We combine these six categories into three: 'single party' (the first category), 'cojJition' (the second and third), and 'minority' (the last three). Table 19 summarizes our results. This table reports the probability of observing one of the four types of fiscal policy stance in each of the government types described above. For instance, the first cell in column (3) gives the probability that a single-party government will engage in a very loose fiscal policy. This probability is constructed as the ratio of the number of observations of very loose fiscal policy episodes carried out by single-party governments, divided by the total number of single-party governments.
In the first three rows, we classify governments according to the fractionalization dimension. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that coalition governments have a slightly higher tendency to engage in very expansionary fiscal policies. Somehow surprisingly, coalition governments and especially minority governments also have a high propensity to engage in very tight fiscal policies. As regards minority governments, this finding can probably be explained by the fact that they also include caretaker governments, which are often given a specific mandate to clean up fiscal policy before a political government takes over.
The striking difference appears in columns (5) and (6), which distinguish between successful and unsuccessful adjustments. Coalition governments are almost always unsuccessful in their adjustment attempts. Out of 23 strong adjustments initiated by coalition governments, only two were successful, which corresponds to a success rate of only 8.7%. By comparison, the success rates of singleparty governments and minority governments are 35.7% and 46.7%, respectively.
These results are generally consistent with the empirical findings of Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and Grilli et al. (1991) ; these authors find that coalition governments follow looser fiscal policies than single-party governments. Our results have a different emphasis: we show that coalition governments do try to be fiscally responsible, but they are unable to implement the types of policy needed to make the Goalidon governments are almost always unsuccessful in their adjustment attempts As we showed in section 5, substantial cuts in social expenditure and in government employment seem to be a prerequisite for a lasting adjustment. However, these are precisely the two types of expenditure that coalition governments are least likely to be able to cut. The reason is that coalition goverrmaents are more likely to succumb to intra-coalition fighting over the distribution of the costs of fiscal adjustments, as discussed theoretically by Spolaore (1993) . The next three rows of Table 19 illustrate the fiscal performance of right-wing, centrist and left-wing governments. Four interesting results emerge. First, the probability of observing very loose fiscal policies is lower with right-wing governments: less than 9%, against more than 15% and 12% in centre and left-wing governments, respectively. Second, somewhat surprisingly, left-wing governments are actually more likely to carry out a very tight fiscal policy than the other two types of government. Third, centrist governments are much more prone to engage in very loose fiscal p>olicies, and w^en they try a strong adjustment they seem to be completely unable to do what it takes to succeed: their success rate is 0, out of six attempts. A plausible explanation is that centrist governments are typically coalition governments of (moderate) right-wing and left-wing parties. Thus, in a sense, this result is perfectly consistent with our previous observation on the difficulty of coalition governments adjusting successfully. Fourth, left-and right-wing governments are about equally likely to make successful fiscal adjustments. One may conjecture that the political means of achieving this success is, however, quite different for the two types of government. Presumably, the left achieves success by an agreement with the unions which allows the government to cany out those types of expenditure cut needed for success. The right presumably achieves success by imposing these measures. In future research, it would be interesting to study whether this hypothesis is empirically valid, and whether the successful adjustments of left-and right-wing governments differ once an even finer disaggregation of government expenditures is used.
Common wisdom and the 'politicsJ business cycle' theory argue that, for obvious reasons, the budget is particularly vulnerable in election years and in recession years. We investigate these issues in the next two tables. The first two rows of Table 20 display the probability that a government will engage in very tight and very loose Gscal policies in election and non-election years. As one can see, these probabilities are very similar. Also very similar are the probabilities of success in election and non-election years, as displayed in the last two lines. These results are not very favourable to the traditional "political business cycle' theory favoured by Nordhaus (1975) , which suggests that politicians will engage in massive expansionary policies in election years. Our results, on the contrary, are not inconsistent with more recent theories (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) and empirical evidence (Alesina et ai, 1993) which emphasize 'rational' political budget cycles. These arguments suggest that voters' rationality and politicians' craving for reputation limit the extent to which politicians can and want to expand fiscal policy in election years. The theory suggests that electoral budget cycles (i.e. loose policies in election years) should be observed only occasionally and should not be very large. The empirical evidence of Alesina et al. (1993) on a sample of twenty OECD countries is consistent with this prediction of the theory, and so are our results.
Electoral budget cycles
should be observed only occasionally and should not be very large Note: Probability of very tight in electoral years: (Number of very tight fiscal stances in electoral years)/(Number of electoral years). Probability of very loose in electoral years: (Number of very loose fiscal stances in electoral years)/(Number of electoral years). Probability of success in electoral years: (Number of successful fiscal stances in electoral years)/(Number of very tight fiscal stances in electoral years). Probability of no success in electoral years: (Number of unsuccessful fiscal stances in electoral years)/(Number of very tight fiscal stances in electoral years). Probabilities in nonelectoral years are defined similarly. Note: Probability of very tight in recession years: (Number of very tight fiscal stances in recession years)/(Number of recession years). Probability of very loose in recession years: (Nuniber of very loose fiscal stances in recession years)/(Number of recession years). Probability of success in recession years: (Number of successful fiscal stances in recession years)/(Number of very tight fiscal stances in recession years). Probability of no success in recession years: (Number of unsuccessful fiscal stances in recession years)/(Number of very tight fiscal stances in recession years). Probabilities in non-recession years are defined similarly.
Finally, we turn to the issue of whether it is easier or more difficult to initiate a strong adjustment during recessions or expansions. We define a recession as a year when the rate of growth of GDP is at least 1 % below the average of the previous two years. Table 21 shows that governments are three times more likely to initiate a very loose fiscal policy in recession years than in non-recession years. Conversely, during a recession governments are about 2.5 times less likely to carry out a strong adjustment. The last two rows of Table 21 show that very tight fiscal policies initiated in non-recession years are twice as likely to be successful as those initiated during recessions. This finding makes intuitive sense: the key ingredients of successful adjustments are cuts in transfer programmes and in public employment, precisely the two types of spending cut that are politically very costly during a recession.
We can summarize the main results of this section as follows: (1) Coalition governments are as likely as other governments to try very tight fiscal policies. However, they seem to be unable to carry out the types of expenditure cut that are needed to make a strong fiscal adjustment long-lasting. As a result, their success rate is drastically lower than that of both minority and single-pjuty governments. (2) Left-and right-wing governments are just about equally likely to carry out successful adjustments. (3) Closeness to elections does not influence the likelihood of strong adjustments, or their success rates.
(4) However, it is much harder to initiate a successful fiscal adjustment during a recession than during an expansion.
DISCUSSION
An important question, which we have not addressed in this paper, concerns the consequences of very tight fiscal policies on growth and employment. Fiscal adjustments can have both negative and positive effects on the economy, as discussed, for instance, in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . On the negative side, a standard Keynesian argument suggests that a reduction in aggregate demand would reduce growth and increase unemployment, at least in the short run. On the positive side, a vigorous fiscal adjustment can bring about a 'credibility effect' on interest rates, reducing risk premia and improving investors' expectations. The result could be a "crowding in' of private investment that would compensate, or even more than compensate, the fall in aggregate demand due to the reduction in government spending and the increase in taxation. Moreover, as emphasized by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993) , a fiscal adjustment brought about by a fall in expenditure can crowd in private consumption as well, by reducing the present discounted value of tax payments. A related question is whether the particular mix of fiscal instruments which has been found to affect the chance of successful adjustments also influences the macroeconomic consequences of the adjustment. Could it be, for instance, that the likelihood of success also determines the level of the 'credibility premium' and therefore the growth and unemployment consequences of the adjustment? In a companion paper (Alesina and Perotti, 1995b) we present evidence that this might well be the case.
First of all, we show that 'heU does not break loose' even after several years of fiscal adjustments. On the contrary, we find that in a majority of cases of multiyear fiscal adjustments, unemployment is lower after the adjustment than it was before. We do not find either that growth is systematically lower, confirming the findings of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) on Denmark and Ireland. We also find that growth is much higher and unemployment lower in the aftermath of successful than after unsuccessful adjustments. This finding raises the issue of causality. Is it the composition of adjustment which determines its success and macroeconomic consequences, or rather is it the (exogenously given) rate of growth which makes success achievable? If it is growth that determines success, the correlation between success and composition of adjustments that we have found above must be spurious. That correlation, however, is easily explained: to succeed, fiscal adjustments must tackle those components of spending that have a 'Hell does not break loose' even after several years of fiscal adjustments Successful fiscal adjustments are associated with major improvements in competitiveness tendency to increase automatically. In addition, reducing government employment, rather than government wages, is likely to have much longer-lasting effects, both because employment cute are difficult to reverse and because they send a stronger signal (on this point, see Tanzi (1993) ). As for the correlation between the composition of adjustment on one side and growth and unemployment on the other, it can be explained by both the 'crowding-in effect' and supply-side effects. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1994 and 1995c) show that tax increases (particularly labour and social security taxes) lead to a fall in competitiveness, as wage demands increase to compensate for the increased fiscal pressure. By contrast, a cut in social transfers could actually improve competitiveness, by reducing the bargaining power of the unions.
Second, the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal adjustments will depend on whether they are accompanied by devaluations and expansionary monetary policies. In Alesina and Perotti (1995b) we show that successful fiscal adjustments are associated with major improvements in competitiveness, while this is not the case for unsuccessful ones. One interpretation of this result is that a fiscal adjustment that is accompanied by a devaluation might be more likely to be both politically acceptable and successful according to our definition. Certainly, devciluations have been important aspects of many fiscal adjustments, for instance in Ireland. However, this interpretation would imply once again that the correlation between composition of the adjustment and success is spurious. On the other hand, there is evidence that fiscal policy influences nominal exchange rates, relative unit labour costs and profitability in ways that are consistent with the other direction of causation and with the importance of the composition of the adjustment. For instance. Lane and Perotti (1995) show that falls in wage government consumption -but not in non-wage government consumptiontend to depreciate the nominal exchange rate; Alesina and Perotti (1994) find similar results for relative unit labour costs. All these arguments, however, 3ic simply suggestive. Much more work is needed to understand better the effects of fiscal adjustmente on macroeconomic variables, and the role of exchange rate and monetary policies.
Finally, in connection with the macroecononrjic effects of fiscal adjustments, it is worth asking the question of their political consequences. Are the governments that implement tight fiscal policies less likely to be reappointed? Does the answer depend upon the degree of success of the adjustment, and on its composition? A relatively large literature shows that macroeconomic conditions (in particular, growth and unemployment) influence electoral outcomes.'" As we show in Alesina and Perotti (1995b) , fiscal adjustments (particularly the successful ones) are not typically accompanied by major recessions, thus they do not necessarily have negative political consequences for the governments that implement them. However, in addition to their effects on aggregate macroeconomic variables, fiscal adjustments may influence elections via distributional effects. These important issues require more attention and a deeper empirical investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
In the last three decades, cyclically adjusted budget deficits in OECD countries have typically been the result of increases in government spending, particularly on transfer programmes and government wages. As public debt increased, interest payments accumulated as well. Fiscal adjustments that relied primarily on tax increases, especially direct taxes on households, typically failed to stop permjtnently the growth of public debt. On the contrary, successful adjustments are those that aggressively tackle the expenditure side, particuljtrly the components of it which are always thought of as untouchable: sociatl security and government wages and employment. The successful adjustment (at least thus far) of Ireland is an excellent example of this. Between 1986 and 1990, transfer programmes were cut from 17.6% of GDP to 14.3%, government employment fell from 307,000 to 269,000 and the debt to GDP ratio fell from 120% to 107%.
Goalition governments are generally unable to carry out successful fiscal adjustments. They often try, but, at least in our sample, never succeed. Our interpretation is that conflicts among coedition members and the fragility of coalition governments make it difficult to maintain a 'tough' fiscal stance, particularly when politically sensitive programmes, government employment and social security are involved. This paper and its companion paper Alesina and Perotti (1995b) send a rather loud and clear message to policy-makers facing the prospect of a fiscal adjustment. In summary, a successful fiscal '" For resulti on OECD countries, see in particular Lewis-Beck (1988 (1) is started during a period of relatively high growth; and (2) does not raise taxes but, rather, cuts transfer programmes and government wages and employment. There is bad news and good news in these results. The bad news is that one cannot avoid cutting transfers and government employment; quite simply, permanently favourable results typically do not follow from politically palatable policies. The good news is that major fiscal adjustments do not cause major recessions. Politicians and their advisers must stop thinking of just about everything on the expenditure side of government budgets as untouchable.
Discussion
Francesco Giavazzi
Universita Bocconi, Milan
Policy-makers who look at textbooks on their shelves to find out the effects of fiscal policy actions are increasingly puzzled. Real-life experiments tell surprising stories. For example, when in 1982 the Irish government introduced a very tight budget, private consumption plummeted. The ensuing recession induced a worsening of the budget that more than offset the initial discretionary tightening. Two years later both the deficit and the debt-GDP ratio were higher. Ireland tried again in 1987. This time, however, output increased, amplifying the discretionary cut in the deficit, and the debt-GDP ratio fell substantially. When in 1990, essentially as a result of a tax reform, fiscail policy in Sweden became expansionary, it was accompanied by a deep recession. Denmark in 1984, Australia in 1987 and some of the other cases reported in Table 6 in the paper are further instances of'surprising' outcomes of a turnaround in fiscal policy. This paper is an important step towards understanding some of these puzzles. It points to the composition of a fiscal contraction as an important determinant of its success, and carefully documents those items in the budget where the cuts are most likely to be associated wdth success. This an important finding but, as the authors recognize, it is just a first step.
Alesina and Perotti define 'success' by looking at what happens to the debt-GDP ratio a few years after the discretionary tightening of fiscal policy. A successful tightening is one that is accompanied, three years later, by a 5% reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. But we know that movements in the debt-GDP ratio are to a large extent explained by movements in GDP, as the numerator is in fact strongly affected by movements in the denominator. The interesting question then is: what are the channels through which the budget cuts that the paper identifies as critical for 'success' induce an expansion in output?
It is not an easy question because large fiscal turnarounds rarely happen in isolation. Typically they are accompanied by a monetary stabilization which is often preceded by an exchange rate devaluation (as documented in the paper by Eichengreen et al. in this issue). The Irish adjustment of 1987 offers one of the cleanest examples, but the same would be true for the Israeli stabilization of 1985. It is difficult to isolate the individual contribution of each item in the policy package to the output expansion. Failing to separate out these effects, however, casts a cloud over the results in the paper. The alternative hypothesis is that the success 'stories' identified in the paper are really a product of the accompanying policies, and not (or not only) of the particular composition of the budget cuts. Admittedly, the authors recognize this point, and argue that the alternative explanation is less likely to be consistent with the data. This is why I see this article as only the first step in an important research agenda.
I have a final small point on the data used for one of the countries in the sample: Portugal. Table 5 shows a 'strong adjustment' in 1980, followed by a 'strong expansion' a year later. This episode, however, has nothing to do with fiscal policy impulses, but simply concerns the fact that in 1980 the Portuguese central bank revalued its gold reserves, and the revaluation was recorded among the revenues in the Treasury books.
Tryphon Kollintzas
Athens University of Economics and Business, CEPR and IMOP
Macroeconomists worry about the effects of changes in aggregate taxes, government consumption and government investment, ignoring the composition of these magnitudes. Public finance insists that the composition of these magnitudes has important implications for many microeconomic issues. The contribution of the present paper lies elsewhere: it shows that the composition also affects the efficacy of stabilization programmes. While I accept the basic validity of the authors' arguments, I wish to mention a number of problems with their methodology.
First, for a number of reasons, the BF/could be a poor measure of discretionary fiscal policy changes. In situations where there are long-term discretionary fiscal policy changes, only the cycle component is considered to have a discretionary sub-component in the implicit trend-cycle decomposition. In addition, there exist situations where discretionary fiscal policy changes look like they are induced by business cycles. This wotdd be the case, for instance, if past and present disaetionary fiscal policy changes were correlated with the unemployment rate. Another reason for being concerned with the BFI is that the unemployment rate is typically lagging behind GDP. It means that the intended removzil of all contemporaneous business cycle-induced fiscal policy changes may be incomplete. Tables 22  and 23 , based on deviations of the data from their trend (obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott method), present evidence on the comovements of government consumption (as a share of GDP) with GDP and the unemployment rate (see Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) for details). With the exception of Canada, in all of the G7 countries the face of these co-movements is different. Finally, the BFI is also a relatively poor measure of international comparisons because the unemployment rate is measured differendy from country to country.
Second, some of the observations about the stylized facts of'loose', 'tight', 'very loose' and 'very tight' fiscal policy are a simple consequence of the classification procedure. For example, only in situations where the sample distribution is very asymmetric should one expect any differences between 'loose' and 'tight' policies under a classification procedure which is based on standard deviations alone. Observations based on a classification of these policies in terms of quintiles is probably more appropriate. Furthermore, the numbers of 'major adjustments' -seven -and the cases that support the conclusions -three or four -are rather small for the generalization made about the macroeconomic effects of these adjustments. And, lastly, the simultaneous presence of the changes in the unemployment rate and GNP in the right-hand side of the regressions, most likely creates multicolinearity problems. The "wrong' signs in some of these regressions may be due to such problems. All these problems with the possible exception of the first two could be easily taken into account using a better trend-cycle decomposition and a better real economic activity variable for the purposes of this paper. Both of these things could be achieved by using, for example, Hodrick-Prescott deviations of GDP.
My main complaint with the paper is that the authors do not carry their analysis to its logical end. They make a convincing case that the composition of aggregate government spending and taxes matters, but they do not use this decomposition to investigate the macroeconomic effects of 'major' adjustments.
General discussion
A significant part of the discussion related to the methodology employed by the authors for assessing the success of fiscal adjustment programmes. Istvan Szekely felt that, in practice, these progreimmes are motivated by a variety of objectives: for instance, they may be designed to control inflation, or to stabilize the currency markets. Their success or failure should be measured in relation to their own objectives, rather than to their achievement of a 5% reduction in the debt/GDP ratio. Further, while the strength of a fiscal stance was measured in terms of fiow variables, its success was judged in terms of changes in a stock value. This left open the possibility that a fairly austere policy, even when it succeeds in cutting the deficit/GDP drastically, is considered to be unsuccessful if its effect on debt/GDP is not large enough, David Begg, adding to this, stated that in the absence of an appropriate counterfactU2il -what the outcome might have been in the absence of the policy intervention -it is hard to assess the success of any policy under question. Mathias Dewatripont was surprised that the authors' definition of a successful adjustment looked only at the reduction in the debt/GDP ratio without any reference to the level from which the reduction took place. He felt the case for reducing the debt must be stronger in Belgium, which has a high debt/GDP ratio, than in Britain or France, where the levels are much lower. Roberto Perotti agreed that initial conditions do matter, but said that controlling for them would make the data too sparse for meaningful analysis.
David Begg drew attention to the fact that the analysis looked at the various determinants of the fiscal stance only one at a time. It could be that the underlying variables were related: for instance, countries with high debt could have a predilection for high transfer payments. Such correlations should be unscrambled. He also pointed out that, because the timing of fiscal adjustments tends to be endogenous -they are more likely to be initiated at the bottom of a slump -there is a sample selection bias if one does not control for the business cycle. Perotti conceded that cyclical adjustments were important, but maintained that they were hard to incorporate since one is never too sure of the precise adjustment procedure to use. Quite mindful of this problem, they had confined their attention to relatively large changes in the fiscal stance of the government, too large to be caused by cyclical variations alone. Georges de Menil felt it was important to include the monetary stance in the analysis, since it did have some effect on the impact of the fiscal stance. Giuseppe Bertola suggested disaggregating the unsuccessful fiscal adjustment programmes according to the underlying causes of failure; the possible reasons for failure might be varied -unanticipated increases in public expenditure or losses in tax revenues, growth being lower than expected, excessively high real interest rates, etc.
The empirical evidence presented by the authors also drew comments. Mathias Dewatripont felt that they had omitted at least some interesting episodes when tracing the fiscal history of the countries in their sample. For instance, they had not picked out 1987 as a period of strong fiscal adjustment in Belgium even though its budget deficit fell dramatically from 11 % of GDP to 7% that year. Georges de Menil, adding to the list of missed fiscal incidents, drew attention to the strong adjustment in France in 1983, and the strong expansions in the USA under Reagan, and in Germany in 1988 after the Bonn Summit.
Alessandra Casella felt less than sure about how to interpret the authors' results. Did they imply that increases in taxes are more contractionary than cuts in spending? Or was it that these two differ in their 'commitment properties': that, because cuts in spending were politically more expensive than an increase in taxation, willingness to cut spending must reveal a government to be tough? Istvan Szekely raised the issue of the political costs of embarking upon adjustment programmes, especially when they turn out to be unsuccessful, and felt the need for a clearer specification of the objective function of the policy-makers. David Begg wondered if changes in the prevailing wisdom, say the Keynesianism of the 1960s versus the real business cycle theories of the 1980s, had had a perceptible effect on the policy responses.
Reacting to earlier comments from Francesco Giavazzi, Roberto Perotti conceded that the exchange rate policy had considerable bearing on the success of adjustment programmes; he also pointed out that the burden of the 1984 fiscal adjustment in Ireland fell on t£ixes, while that of 1987-9 was borne by government employment, which fell by 10%. He thought that the Irish example supported their argument positively, while Italy supported it negatively.
APPENDIX
This appendix describes the fiscal variables used in the paper and in the tables. All variables are from OECD. TRANSF: social security benefits + social assistance grants + unfunded employee pension and welfare benefits + transfers to the rest of the world + transfers to private non-profit institutions serving households + net casualty insurance premiums + other transfers. 
PRIMDEF = EXP -REVEN -CFKG -KTRRG
Consumption of fixed capital: 'The value, at current replacement costs, of the reproducible fixed assets .... used up during a period of account as a result of normal wear and tear, foreseen obsolence and the normal rate of accidental damage.' Direct taxes on income: 'Levies by public authorities at regular intervals, except social security contributions, on income from employment, property, capital gains, or any other source.'
Final consumption expenditure of government services: 'The value of goods and services produced for their own use on current account, that is the value of their gross output less the sum of the value of their commodity and non-commodity sales and the value of their own-account capital formation which is not segregated to an industry. The value of their gross output is equal to the sum of their intermediate consumption of goods and services, compensation of employees, consumption of fixed capital and indirect taxes.' Government cross fixed capital formation: 'The oudays, purchases and own-account production of producers of government services on additions of new durable goods (commodities) to their stocks of fixed assets ... Excluded are the outlays of government services on durable goods for military use.' Indirect taxes: 'Taxes assessed on producers in resjiect of their production, sale, purchase, or use of goods and services, which they charge to the expenses of production. Also included are import duties and the operating surplus, reduced by the normal margin of profits of business units, of fiscal and simDar monopolies of government'. Social security benefits: 'Payments made to individuals under social security schemes, usually out of a special fund.' Subsidies: 'All grants on current account made by government to private industries and public corporations.'
